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Prophets, Priests, and Pragmatists
Christopher H. Schroeder
Growth chestnuts have to be placed on the unyielding anvil of
biophysical realities and then crushed with the hammer of moral
argument. The entropy law and ecology provide the biophysical anvil.
Concern for future generations and subhuman life and inequities in
current wealth distribution provide the moral hammer.
- Herman E. Daly1
I. PROPHETS, PRIESTS, AND PRAGMATISTS
For environmentalists, the seven years between 1968 and
1975 were exciting times. The American environmental
movement scored an impressive array of legislative victories in
the chambers of Congress. The National Environmental Policy
Act, the Clean Air and Water Acts, the Endangered Species
Act, the Marine Mammal Protection Act, and modern pesticides
legislation-not to mention the creation of the Environmental
Protection Agency, done pursuant to presidential
reorganization of the executive branch-are all products of that
time.
These environmental movement successes did not spring
up miraculously in the days around the first Earth Day, April
22, 1970. To the contrary, the events of that day, which drew
participation from some 20 million people across the country,
were themselves more the product of the movement's success
than a cause of it. Not that Earth Day was irrelevant to
t Professor of Law and Public Policy Studies and director of the
Program in Public Law, Duke University. My thanks to Sid Shapiro and Rob
Glicksman for discussions of pragmatism and its application to environmental
policy, to Sid and all the participants at, the Symposium, The Pragmatic
Ecologist: Environmental Protection as a Jurisdynamic Experience at the
University of Minnesota Law School for their valuable comments on this
Essay, to Jim Chen for the invitation to present a version of the Essay at the
conference, and to Dan Farber for his enormous contributions to so many
fields of law-and, appropriately for this occasion-especially for founding the
growing field of eco-pragmatism.
1. Herman E. Daly, Introduction to the Steady-State Economy, in
ECONOMICS, ECOLOGY, ETHICS I, II (Herman E. Daly ed., 1980).
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subsequent events-it vividly demonstrated the potential
electoral clout of environmentally concerned citizens, which in
turn drove the legislative activity of that period.2 Like all
successful social movements, the environmental movement
made serious headway when it was able to find actions and
projects that could be enthusiastically endorsed by many
different attitudes and perspectives, bringing people together
under a big environmental tent to all push for social and
legislative reform. Earth Day and early 1970s
environmentalism fed off the energy of many types of thinking,
while at the same time masking the diversity of that thinking.
Conservation philosophy, vegetarianism, transcendentalism,
strands of Judeo-Christian thought, wilderness philosophies,
preservationism, Malthusian ideas, Eastern religious thinking,
public health consciousness, the wellness movement, self-
interested anxieties, and environmental economics all found
some common ground.
Within this broad coalition of ideas and traditions, one
could always hear a prophetic voice, strongly indicting business
as usual and putting forth a call to redemption. There is no
single strand within the environmental tradition to which this
voice can be traced, but it clearly was never as "big tent" as the
movement as a whole. In particular, neo-classical welfare
economics did not attend many meetings of the prophets. The
motivational side of the prophetic message expresses two
recurring convictions. First, there are limits to growth. The
carrying capacity of ecosystems both local and global can be
strained to the breaking point by the pressures of human
development, which could leave them in a state from which
they would not soon recover. Human ingenuity can put off the
day of reckoning, perhaps, but not indefinitely. Second, our
spheres of moral concern extend beyond ourselves and our
immediate community to include other living things, future
generations, and the earth itself.3
2. For a thoughtful account of the first Earth Day and the early
environmental agenda, see MARY GRAHAM, THE MORNING AFTER EARTH DAY
(1999).
3. See, e.g., NEIL CARTER, THE POLITICS OF THE ENVIRONMENT 63 (2001)
("Ecologism is an ideology built on two main ideas: a reconceptualization of the
human-nature relationship away from strong anthropocentrism and an
acceptance of the idea of limits to growth."). I almost included a third
conviction in the text. Experiencing nature in its pristine form provides
religious or spiritual rewards that will be diminished and eventually lost
under the pressures of ever-advancing urbanization and suburbanization.
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The epigram that begins this Essay expresses these two
ideas in strong form; together they form the hammer and the
anvil of criticism directed at the kind of growth and
consumerism registered by measures like gross domestic
product.
This is to be expected, because the two [convictions] are not as
logically independent as may at first appear. For example, many
moral issues regarding distributive justice and intergenerational
equity hardly arise if one believes that continual economic growth is
biophysically possible. Likewise, if one's arena of moral concern
excludes the poor, future generations and subhuman life, then many
biophysical constraints are no longer of interest.4
For many critics of economic growth as we currently measure
it, the only ways that ecological collapse and moral disaster can
be avoided entail substantial transformations in basic
economic, social, technological, and ideological institutions and
structures. 5 The call to achieve that transformation is the
essence of the prophetic message.
In the heady days of the early 1970s, some of this
transformative fervor seemed to gain a foothold in the
Congress. A number of the early legislative successes seemed
to reflect a transformative imperative. The Clean Water Act
called for eliminating all discharges of pollution in the nation's
waters by 1985; the Clean Air Act mandated compliance with
tough ambient air quality standards by 1975. Other elements
of the legislative environment influenced the shape of that
This third possible pillar of environmental prophetic thinking can be too
human-centered to those who want to downplay all forms of human-centered
values and to elevate other values. Nonetheless, valuing wilderness' rewards
to the human spirit does help explain the impassioned commitments people
often have to environmental causes. Edward Abbey's writings are exemplary
in painting the connection between feeling enriched by wilderness and
insisting on strong measures to prevent its further degradation. E.g., EDWARD
ABBEY, DESERT SOLITAIRE (1968); EDWARD ABBEY, THE MONKEY WRENCH
GANG (1985). One ought to be able to find the spiritual value of nature to be
an argument for considerateness toward nature that does not reduce nature to
a mere tool of human progress, which is what many advocates of eco-centrism
wish to prevent. This spiritual element in environmentalism lies largely
outside the analytic approach of this Essay, however, so I will leave it in the
margins.
4. Daly, supra note 1, at 10-11.
5. E.g., CARTER, supra note 3, at 20 (describing point six of the eight-
point platform of deep ecology as the position that "[p]olicies affecting basic
economic, technological and ideological structures must change" and point
eight of that platform as the assertion that "[t]hose who subscribe to the above
have an obligation directly or indirectly to participate in the attempt to
implement the necessary changes").
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legislation, including optimism about technological fixes and
the desire by national industries and some states to replace
variant state standards with uniform national ones. At the
same time, however, electoral competition for the emerging
environmental vote undoubtedly played an important role, and
the call of the environmental prophets seemed to have enough
electoral clout to require action by elected officials.
The environmental movement of this period transformed
discourse about our environmental condition, driving from the
public scene arguments that environmental problems ought not
to be taken seriously. To the extent there was disagreement on
that score (and there undoubtedly was more than was publicly
voiced) it was rather quickly driven underground. Just as
racial epithets have been placed outside social norms, direct
denial that environmental quality ought to be improved did not
take place in polite company anymore. By 1990, David Broder
could write that the environmental argument is "no longer
about values. That's over... The argument now is about
policies."6 This means, of course, that the argument is now
about the policies embodied in the early legislation, because not
much has changed in the basic regulatory structure. Those
policies have increasingly become lightning rods of criticism,
and in recent years their supporters have decidedly been on the
defensive. Environmental issues have migrated from
consensus politics into the politics of division.
Many critics now ridicule the present environmental
regulatory structure because it is riddled with self-defeating
aspirational commands and provisions that are irrational or
lack common sense, are too rigidly uniform and prescriptive,
create perverse incentives, are unnecessarily adversarial, and
fail to acknowledge costs, or countervailing risks, or the
wealthier is healthier effect. Many of these criticisms come
from people who support the objective of improving
environmental quality but want to strike a different balance
between environmental goals and competing social values. I
will refer to such people as the environmental priests.
Environmental priests preach a message of reform, not
transformation. They believe that economic and technological
institutions and structures have flaws and that it is important
that we work to change them. They may also periodically issue
6. David S. Broder, Beyond Folk Songs and Flowers, WASH. POST, Apr.
22, 1990, at B7.
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calls for sacrifice and rededication to an ideal, but not too often
or too stridently. After all, they have institutions to maintain,
donors to attract, and the continuity and concerns of a larger
society to support. Furthermore, they simply do not believe
that things are as dire as the prophets proclaim, or that
existing institutions are as incapable of reform as prophets
fear. Just as environmentalism has always had its prophets, it
has always had its priests.
When environmental priests criticize the legislation that
the prophets defend, they very often do so using the tools and
framework of applied neo-classical economics. The ambition of
applied economics is to show a society how it might perfect the
production and allocation of goods and services so as best to
satisfy what consumers in the society now want. In the hands
of a cautious economist, the ambition is descriptive, not
prescriptive. The priests frequently take the suggestions of
economic analysis to the next step, however, urging that
environmental policy ought to be molded so as to implement
what economics recommends. When carefully delivered, the
message always includes caveats about how distributional or
ethical or moral claims can intervene to send policy in other
directions. In practice, however, the priests find few such
claims to be adequate, and their criticisms of existing policies
usually boil down to the objection that they are not efficient.
Efficiency is a cold concept, and outside of professional
gatherings it does not gather a lot of warm support among the
public. Instead, the public message of the priests comes in the
terms mentioned a moment ago: The present way of doing
things is irrational, rigidly uniform, and prescriptive; creates
perverse incentives; seems unnecessarily adversarial; and fails
to acknowledge all the good things that could be done with the
money being spent on foolish environmental policies. Even
when pressed about what norm is implied by these criticisms,
the answer is still likely not to be efficiency. Instead, it will be
freedom of choice, giving people what they want. Thus the
priests have convictions as do the prophets; they are just
different convictions: Things are not as dire as the prophets
say, and it is important to focus policy on what people want. In
general, people should be able to have what they as individual
consumers in the marketplace would purchase. Unlike
transformative environmentalism,
[t]he economist rejects absolutes: what is good is what the individual
prefers; a good society is one that maximizes freedom of choice. The
economists' values speak to the question of how society should be
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organized in order to satisfy individual desires, whatever they may
be.... The economists' model.., seems... more in keeping with
democratic theory in a pluralistic society.
7
Over the past thirty years, prophets and priests have been
in something of a standoff. On some fronts, the priests have
made gains. As environmental issues assume an on-going and
ever larger' role in national, state, and local debates, the
vernacular of the priesthood has gained an upper hand as the
language used in the policy debates.8 The regulatory process
has also become increasingly burdened with analytic steps such
as regulatory impact analyses and calculations of the implied
value of human life associated with regulatory interventions,
which serve to provide impetus to economics-based attacks on
the environmental regulatory system. Those attacks have had
some successes in altering some rules, regulations, and
enforcement policies.
By and large, however, the basic statutory structure has
remained in place, and this must be considered a success for
the prophets, because any replacements of the status quo would
most likely have been statutes less sympathetic to the
transformative message. Transformative environmentalism
has been able to resist legislative change because it enjoys an
enormous advantage in the legislative chambers: The American
people generally like the regulatory system that is in place. In
times of highly divisive environmental politics, the benefits of
the legislative inertia that comes simply as a consequence of
the difficulties of moving bills through the legislative process
cannot be underestimated. A status quo bias also produces on-
going support for the present system when the possible vectors
for change pose a risk of loss compared to that the status quo.
Some people may resist this loss for purely or largely self-
interested reasons, and not because of a commitment to the two
convictions of the prophetic message. This makes them allies
with the prophets, even if their purely self-interested
commitments would not go down well at an environmental tent
meeting. As a consequence of this confluence of factors, explicit
changes in the existing regulatory structure have been hard to
achieve.
7. Charles J. Meyers, An Introduction to Environmental Thought: Some
Sources and Some Criticisms, 50 IND. L.J. 426, 452-53 (1975).
8. I am talking about professional policy debate. When environmental
issues go public, as in public meetings or debates in legislative bodies, the
prophetic language provides significant rhetorical resources and is regularly
used.
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For some in the environmental movement, however, this
status quo advantage has begun to resemble a pair of golden
handcuffs. There is much in the existing regulatory structure
that environmentalists would like to change, 9 but they fear that
if they show receptivity to opening up the status quo to
revision, any moves away from the present structure will end
up being even further away from their ideal point. The
resulting policy stand-off generates discontent in almost all
quarters. We now have a policy landscape dotted with a
variety of proposals, including second-generation policies and
ideas to reinvent environmental regulation, to make it more
reflexive, to take it down the road of third way, 10 or to become
more pragmatic. The concepts and recommendations of these
initiatives overlap considerably. All, in one way or another,
propose to continue the search for improved environmental
policy by surmounting the current impasse between prophets
and priests. They all try to straddle or triangulate the two
existing camps. They join in criticizing traditional
environmental regulation, often in ways similar to the priestly
criticisms," while claiming to move environmental policy in the
general direction that the prophets desire. All of the new
initiatives embrace regulatory strategies that are more flexible,
more contextual, and more responsive to developments in
science and other relevant knowledge.
In addition to repeating priestly criticisms, some versions
of these reform initiatives also endorse many of the suggestions
that the priests offer. Emissions-trading schemes, removing
environmentally perverse subsidies on natural resource use,
and worst-things-first regulatory strategies are popular in
many reinventing regulation and second-generation circles, for
instance. Other recent reform proposals offer an approach to
9. On what some of those changes are, see infra Part III.
10. See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
11. The newer critiques generally refrain from claiming that the
traditional regulatory structure was a mistake from the beginning. Instead,
they argue that the traditional regulatory approach has served us well. It is
now simply time to adjust to changed circumstances, created in part by the
early successes, and to realize that further environmental improvements must
pursue new strategies. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as
Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to
a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 263 (2001) ("Conventional approaches to
environmental regulation are nearing a dead end, limited by the capacity of
regulators to acquire the information necessary to set regulatory standards
and keep pace with rapid changes in knowledge, technology, and
environmental conditions.").
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environmental problem solving that are different from the
economics-based ideas, but also more reasonable than the rigid
course of action staked out by the prophets and currently
cemented into federal legislation.
Environmental pragmatism falls into the second camp,
presenting itself as something quite distinct from merely a
kinder and gentler version of economics-based proposals. In
separating itself from economics-based policy, environmental
pragmatists seek to head off a confusion that is certainly worth
anticipating, given the strong instrumentalist,
consequentialist, and scientific elements found in both
pragmatism and economics. Thus, Professor Dan Farber's eco-
pragmatism counsels that "economic analysis is useful, but not
controlling .... [Elconomic efficiency is an inadequate basis for
environmental policy.' 2 Sid Shapiro and Rob Glicksman's
version asserts that the existing risk regulation system is
largely consistent with pragmatism-a strong indicator that
their pragmatism is not coextensive with economic analysis,
which so eagerly criticizes how we currently regulate risk-and
that it "offers a method of deciding risk issues that is preferable
to the comprehensive analytical rationality [i.e., economic
analysis] favored by the critics of risk regulation."13
To my knowledge, none of the current practitioners of
environmental pragmatism have ever embraced the economics-
based approach. Some seem to be former prophets frustrated
by their inability to influence the forward direction of
environmental policy in light of policy makers' increasing
preoccupation with economic analysis. For example, the editors
of a collection of essays by a group of environmental
philosophers who have taken the pragmatic turn describe
themselves as persons who are "deeply concerned about the
precarious state of the natural world, the environmental
hazards that threaten humans, and the maintenance of long-
term sustainable life on this planet." 4 Despite having "made
significant progress in the analysis of the moral relationship
between humanity and the non-human natural world," they
found it "difficult to see what practical effect the field of
environmental ethics has had on the formation of
12. DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PRAGMATISM 9 (1999).
13. SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN, RISK REGULATION AT
RISK 13 (2003).
14. Andrew Light & Eric Katz, Introduction, to ENVIRONMENTAL
PRAGMATISM 1, 1 (Andrew Light & Eric Katz eds., 1996).
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environmental policy," 15 and concluded that pragmatism may
produce more practical results than the prophetic voices of
environmental ethics have been able to achieve.
More generally, environmental pragmatism has a message
for prophets and their sympathizers that goes something like
this: Take the pragmatic turn. This is a way to make further
progress toward the objectives to which you are committed.
Together we can claim a determining role in policy debates to
protect the planet and achieve a sustainable society. This is
not environmental pragmatism's sole message or constituency,
but it raises interesting and important questions about the
nature of environmentalism, and it is the one we will explore in
the pages that follow.
Right away, the invitation to convert from prophetic
leanings to pragmatic ones raises a series of questions about
just what is being asked. To borrow a pragmatic expression,
what is the cash value of a conversion to pragmatism?
Consider some possibilities. Environmental pragmatism might
be saying that it is a better way to inscribe the commitments of
transformative environmentalism-limits to growth and wider
spheres of moral consideration-into policy. If so,
environmental pragmatism would relate to transformative
environmentalism in the same way that Anthony Giddens
understands the third way to relate to social democracy. "[The]
'third way,"' Giddens writes, "refers to a framework of thinking
and policy-making that seeks to adapt social democracy to a
world which has changed fundamentally over the past two or
three decades." 16 For Giddens, the third way does not require
jettisoning any fundamental tenets of social democracy. It
represents new-style social democracy, which old-style social
democrats ought to adopt because it constitutes a superior
means to their original ends. 17 Analogously, environmental
pragmatism might be claiming to be a better way to achieve
transformative ends than the inflexible, irrational, flat-footed,
one-size-fits-all methods of old. Alternatively, pragmatism's
services might be offered more modestly, as but a modus
vivendi, a way for the prophets who wish to engage in policy
debates to navigate the political pluralism of our modern
society. As yet another possibility, environmental pragmatism
15. Id.
16. ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY 26 (1998).
17. See id.
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might be inconsistent with transformative environmentalism,
but nonetheless eager to convert prophets to its approach.18
Pragmatism's rejection of foundationalism and its desire to
avoid debate over high theory suggests that possibility. 19
Because the prophetic voice seems committed to foundational
beliefs and continues to engage economic critics in theoretical
debates, perhaps the deep message of environmental
pragmatism to the prophets is that they should give up their
calling.20
A final possibility is of a different kind from those just
mentioned. Environmental pragmatism might be part of a
larger theory of governance in a pluralistic society, in which
transformative environmentalism is merely one of a number of
competing perspectives with which the body politic has to deal.
In this guise, environmental pragmatism would be pragmatism
applied to environmental problems in much the same way that
environmental economics is economics applied to
environmental problems. There would be nothing particularly
environmental about it, save that environmental problems are
its particular field of attention. There are moments of
pragmatism offered by Shapiro and Glicksman that have this
flavor, as when they suggest that "pragmatism has no
substantive content of its own, [nonetheless] it avoids an
analytical muddle by adopting and clarifying existing values
relevant to the problem at hand."21 As such, "when a conflict
between social values arises, the pragmatic approach," lays
claim to being the approach that "seeks to reconcile collective
judgment and social principles in the best manner possible." 22
18. This seems to be David Roe's interpretation of environmental
pragmatism (or at least Farber's version of environmental pragmatism). He
interprets Eco-pragmatism as a "plea for someone-anyone-to give up on
orthodoxy and start to use a pragmatic approach to environmental problems."
David Roe, Green Scholarship, 3 GREEN BAG 2d 97, 97 (1999) (book review).
19. For a discussion of these features of pragmatism, see infra Part III.
20. E.g., Light & Katz, supra note 14, at 4-5.
The pragmatist claims of all the papers here, as we hope is clear, is
[sic] towards finding workable solutions to environmental problems
now. Pragmatists cannot tolerate theoretical delays to the
contribution that philosophy may make to environmental questions
.... The call for moral pluralism, the decreasing importance of
theoretic debates and the placing of practical issues of policy
consensus in the foreground of concern, are central aspects of our
conception of environmental pragmatism.
Id.
21. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13, at 19.
22. Id. at 20.
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If the environmental pragmatists are pragmatists in this
last sense, environmental pragmatism will provoke a
discussion quite reminiscent of the long-standing debate over
whether an environmentalist can simultaneously be committed
to environmentalism and democracy. The tension between
environmentalism and democracy comes about because "[t]o
advocate democracy is to advocate procedures, to advocate
environmentalism is to advocate substantive outcomes: what
guarantee can we have that the former procedures will yield
the latter sorts of outcomes?"23 If environmental pragmatism is
but a methodology being adventitiously applied to
environmental problems, the analogous question about
environmentalism and pragmatism would confront us. Such an
interpretation would not be far-fetched. In those parts of the
pragmatic tradition that address social or political theory, most
prominently associated with the work of John Dewey, the
pragmatic approach -to governance has a number of points in
common with contemporary theories of deliberative
democracy.24  If political-philosophical pragmatism can
properly be seen as the working out of a particular brand of
democracy, then it should hardly be surprising that the
environmentalism-democracy debate would be recapitulated in
the context of environmental pragmatism.
I do not intend to evaluate each of these different
possibilities. One reason for my reticence is that exploring
these possibilities would require more certitude about what
environmental pragmatism is than I currently possess. Even
without "environmental" added on, an initial problem is that "I
don't know what it means today to be a pragmatist."25 So says
Ruth Anna Putnam, who has thought a lot about that question.
David ' Luban, another who has thought extensively about
pragmatism, says there are three kinds: primitive,
philosophical, and postphilosophical. 26 Those three kinds must
23. ROBERT E. GOODIN, GREEN POLITICAL THEORY 168 (1992).
24. See, e.g., Robert B. Westbrook, Pragmatism and Democracy:
Reconstructing the Logic of John Dewey's Faith, in THE REVIVAL OF
PRAGMATISM 128, 138 (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998) ("I think we might say that
Dewey was anticipating an ideal that contemporary democratic theorists have
dubbed 'deliberative democracy."')..
25. Ruth Anna Putnam, Taking Pragmatism Seriously, in HILARY
PUTNAM: PRAGMATISM AND REALISM 7, 7 (James Conant & Urszula M. Zeglen
eds., 2002).
26. David Luban, The Posner Variations (Twenty Seven Variations on a
Theme by Holmes), 48 STAN. L. REV. 1001, 1007-09 (1996).
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cover a lot of territory, because Luban elsewhere says,
"'pragmatism' can refer to almost anything."27 Patrick Diggins
thinks pragmatism has a "split personality."28 Hilary Putnam
has been called a pragmatist, but he has said that is not so. 29
Farber has contributed one of the leading books on the subject
of environmental pragmatism, 30 as to which Lisa Heinzerling
has expressed significant reservations, and yet Heinzerling
says her own environmentalism has many points in common
with pragmatism. 31 If it is difficult to get a clean grip on
pragmatism, and if environmental pragmatism remains young
and contested territory, arguing for a particular interpretation
would be exhaustively time-consuming, and stipulating an
interpretation would be foolhardy. For now, I am sticking with
Ruth Anna Putnam.
Pragmatism's slippery nature has not discouraged a good
number of people from discussing pragmatism, and it will not
muzzle me entirely either. It does, however, counsel a modest
agenda from here on out. The remainder of this Essay will
limit itself to exploring some of the more basic issues raised by
the invitation to prophets that they join pragmatism. First, it
will identify several fundamental elements of pragmatism, ones
which would appear on many lists of pragmatism's
commitments. Then it will examine how much tension there is
between those commitments on the one hand, and the hammer,
anvil, and strong critique of current patterns of consumption
and growth that are central to the prophetic message on the
other.
Part II takes up pragmatism's commitment to social action
or social control. Part III examines pragmatism's beliefs about
truth that stress inquiry, tentativeness, revisability, and the
testing of ideas. Finally, Part IV discusses pragmatism's
understanding that ends as well as means are susceptible to
rational argument, with the result that ends are subject to the
same norms of inquiry as are means. In each case, there are
27. Id. at 1007.
28. JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, THE PROMISE OF PRAGMATISM 455 (1994).
29. Putnam, supra note 25, at 7.
30. FARBER, supra note 12.
31. Lisa Heinzerling, Pragmatists and Environmentalists, 113 HARV. L.
REV. 1421, 1426 (2000) (reviewing DANIEL A. FARBER, ECO-PAGMATISM
(1999)) ("ITlhe experiential, skeptical, and transformative attitude of
pragmatism is a close, even if somewhat abstract, cousin of my own vision of
environmentalism.").
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moments when an environmental prophet and an
environmental pragmatist might well agree, but there are also
moments of tension or friction between them.
II. SOCIAL ACTION
Of the three patriarchs of pragmatism-Peirce, James, and
Dewey-Dewey contributed far more than did the other two to
the development of a pragmatic understanding of social action
and social decision making. Whereas some environmental
priests urge organizing society "to satisfy individual desires,
whatever they may be," 32 Dewey did not.33 This was not
because he rejected the freedom to choose as an ideal, but
because he thought that modern industrial conditions made it
imperative for intelligent social action to establish the
preconditions for liberating and enabling the full exercise of
human capacities for "free individual development."34 Dewey
believed that public intervention in the economy and in the
society was required to realize an "effective liberty,"35 not just a
liberty to enjoy whatever impoverished choices the individual
might confront. To him, freedom of choice became valuable
when individuals confronted choices that made the
development of human capacities possible.
Dewey did not think that what was required for effective
self-development of the individual could be determined at the
level of theory. Instead, "the particular course of action
required in order to further liberalism's 'enduring ideals' can
only be determined once the specific [historical] situation has
been surveyed,"36 and even then only after embracing the
possibility that the course of action thought appropriate might
be wrong and hence that experimentation would be necessary.
In the context of the particular situation of America in the late
19th and early 20th century, Dewey saw a society afflicted by a
"rising tide of human misery, economic instability, narrowed
paths of opportunity, shocking concentrations of wealth, the
oppressive exercise of private power, a debasement of moral
and cultural standards, and the erosion of traditional patterns
32. Meyers, supra note 7, at 452.
33. The discussion of Dewey in this Part relies primarily on the account in
MATTHEw FESTENSTEIN, PRAGMATISM AND POLITICAL THEORY 72-79 (1997).
34. Id. at 72.
35. Id. at 73.
36. Id.
1077
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
of deference and loyalty."37  This diagnosis led him to
recommend public interventions in the economy and society
that were quite far reaching, including a massive program of
public works, especially in housing; nationalization of banking,
public utilities, transportation, and communications; an
enforceable guarantee of the right to work; and a minimum
wage. 38
Dewey's idea that the analysis of social problems and
hence of governmental response to them must be situated and
contextual can easily be embraced by environmental prophets.
It has been careful factual analysis of post-World War II
economic, environmental, and institutional conditions that has
generated the current diagnosis of the world's environmental
problems. Nuclear energy, synthetic organic compounds,
persistent organic pesticides, enormous amounts of green house
gases, and populations of five billion people and more make
analysis of our environmental situation, and hence any
recommendations for improving that situation, embedded in a
particular context.
Most important, Dewey's belief that the role of social
analysis contemplated positive government action beyond the
perfecting of private markets, including establishing the
frameworks within which major institutions would operate (in
Dewey's case extending to the nationalization of major portions
of the economy), also resonates with transformative
environmentalism. 39 To be sure, part of the heritage and
content of the prophetic message is a call to individual reform,
a change of lifestyle and a rejection of consumerism,
materialism, and self-centeredness. This is an aspect of the
message that makes some people uneasy and others dismissive,
either because such personal reformation is thought to be
impossible or dictatorial or both. Besides this individual-level
message, though, there has always been a strong element of
37. David E. Price, Community and Control: Critical Democratic Theory
in the Progressive Period, 68 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 1663, 1663 (1974). Price
argues that Dewey and the Progressive's analysis of the social and economic
situation of the period have many affinities with one and another. See id. at
1671-73.
38. FESTENSTEIN, supra note 33, at 73.
39. See, e.g., SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13, at 4 ("The
environmental and consumer movements that were instrumental in obtaining
risk regulation were premised on the belief that the operation of private
markets must be consistent with the social values that citizens establish
through democratic deliberation and lawmaking.").
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prophetic environmentalism that speaks to institutional reform
and that sees a substantial role for governmental policy in
reorienting institutions in ways that promote sustainability.
One of the mottos developed as part of Canada's study of the
road to becoming a less environmentally disruptive society was
the idea of "doing more with less," but this was not so much a
reference to doing without as it was to being smarter in what
we do.40 In this country, Amory Lovins created quite a stir with
the publication of Soft Energy Paths, which included an
argument that we could completely eliminate construction of
new electrical power plants because the essential demands for
electricity were only a small percentage of actual usage and
alternative, environmentally friendly energy delivery systems
could supply the other needs.41 The conviction that there are
institutional and technological transformations that will not
require a "return to nature" and primitivism underlies-and
may be the only way to make sense of-the regular
pronouncements of the Clinton administration that its policies
created "win-win" situations for the environment and for the
economy. Self-denial and asceticism play minuscule roles in
such analysis, and institutional reform, technological change,
and the need for governmental policies get center stage.
Dewey wrote a good deal about nature, but not from an
environmentalist perspective; 42 I am aware of no passages in
his considerable oeuvre in which he discusses the problems of
the natural environment, as opposed to problems of the human
social and economic environment. 43  His thinking seems
40. SCIENCE COUNCIL OF CANADA, REPORT No. 27, CANADA AS A
CONSERVER SOCIETY: RESOURCE UNCERTAINTIES AND THE NEED FOR NEW
TECHNOLOGIES 14, 28-29 (1977) ("Ecology of design should not be equated
With an approach that is either anti-technology or anti-industry. Rather the
principle means simply that we must use the technology we have in more
thoughtful ways.").
41. See AMORY B. LOVINS, SOFT ENERGY PATHS 18 (1977).
42. For an effort to interpret Dewey as a precursor to environmental
pragmatism, see Larry A. Hickman, Nature as Culture: John Dewey's
Pragmatic Naturalism, in ENVIRONMENTAL PRAGMATISM, supra note 14, at
50.
43. Dewey talks of humankind taking action to "turn the powers of nature
to account," but this is in the sense of harnessing nature's power for
humankind's security; but there is no explicit awareness that humankind's
modifications of nature could themselves produce their own environmental
hazards. See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE 42 (1925)
[hereinafter EXPERIENCE AND NATURE] ("Man fears because he exists in a
fearful, an awful world. The world is precarious and perilous."); JOHN DEWEY,
THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY 3 (1929) [hereinafter QUEST FOR CERTAINTY]
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preoccupied with figuring out how to control nature to serve
human ends. On the other hand, a Deweyan pragmatist
focuses on problem solving and would be open to evidence that
environmental degradation is now a much more pressing
problem than when Dewey was first developing his philosophy,
and that it consequently deserves explicit attention. Dewey
urged orienting social analysis toward the anticipation of the
next set of problems. In The Quest for Certainty, he wrote,
What there is genuine danger of is that the force of new conditions
will produce disruption externally and mechanically: this is an ever
present danger. The prospect is increased, not mitigated, by that
conservatism which insists upon the adequacy of old standards to
meet new conditions. What is needed is intelligent examination of
the consequences that are actually effected by inherited institutions
and customs, in order that there may be intelligent consideration of
the ways in which they are to be intentionally modified in behalf of
generation of different consequences.
This is the significant meaning of transfer of experimental method
from the technical field of physical experience to the wider field of
human life."
Had he been active into the 1970s, Dewey would quite
likely have seen environmental degradation as a powerful "new
disruption," requiring the "intentional modification" of
"inherited institutions and customs" to "generate different
consequences."45  We can speculate that while Dewey's
pragmatism might well have turned him toward the
environment as a significant social problem had he lived into
the 1960s and 1970s, environmental prophets have difficulty
with what appears to be an exclusive focus in Dewey's thought
on the individual and her capacities of self-development as the
values that social action ought to be advancing.
III. BELIEFS ABOUT TRUTH
Pragmatism is most widely known for its understanding of
truth and knowledge. Many questions that philosophers have
long thought central to the discipline, such as the nature of
a priori knowledge and the foundations of rational beliefs,
pragmatists argued were unanswerable and above all not
useful. As Farber so nicely puts it in Eco-pragmatism, trying to
resolve foundational questions is akin to following a most
difficult recipe: "Step 1: Settle the questions originally raised by
(describing different ways to react to the "world of hazards").
44. QUEST FOR CERTAINTY, supra note 43, at 272-73.
45. See id. Dewey died in 1952.
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Plato by providing an indisputable definition of the nature of
'the good.' Step 2: Apply the results of step 1 to the particular
problems of environmental quality."46 Pragmatists-including
environmental pragmatists-argue that we should just
abandon Step 1 as an inquiry leading only to a dead end.
Letting it go entails coming to believe that the search for
apodictic foundations and grand theories that unify and resolve
all questions of value and commitment is impossible and, thus,
an unprofitable use of our time. In the place of the search for
a priori foundations of knowledge, pragmatists-including
environmental pragmatists-substitute a "dynamic,
experimental, iterative, and adaptive problem-solving approach
to the acquisition of knowledge and adjustment of social
policy."47 Abandoning foundationalism and grand unified
theories, they instead embrace learning from experience and
subjecting ends as well as means to analysis and judgment in
terms of their consequences. This Part argues that prophets
can both abandon foundationalism and unified grand theories
and embrace learning from experience without losing their
critical stance and prophetic message. Part IV separately
discusses pragmatism's approach to the analysis of ends.
Foundationalism has been described as the search for
abstract, a priori grounds for belief, for some "permanent,
ahistorical matrix or framework to which we can ultimately
appeal in determining the nature of rationality, knowledge,
truth, reality, goodness or rightness."48  The contrary of
foundationalism is fallibilism--"instead of resting on apodictic
bedrock, we view our knowledge as open to revision and critical
examination."49
The hunt for grand theory is often associated with
foundationalism, because the object of most foundationalist
inquiries is a system, or grand theory, that we can use to
adjudicate disagreements, whether they be about what is true,
what is real, or what is the good in life. Foundationalism and
grand theory are distinct ideas, however. Someone with a
46. FARBER, supra note 12, at 40.
47. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and
Managing Government's Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
903, 906 n.11 (2002).
48. RICHARD BERNSTEIN, BEYOND OBJECTIVISM AND RELATIVISM 8 (1983).
Bernstein is defining objectivism, but the language works as well for
foundationalism.
49. FESTENSTEIN, supra note 33, at 5.
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particularly dark view of the world might be a foundationalist
who is convinced that what is permanently and unchangeably
true about the world is conflict, discord, and inconsistency.
Likewise, someone could subscribe to a unified grand theory
without basing it on ahistorical truth. For example, in its later
formulations, John Rawls' theory of justice is a thoroughly
constructivist one, derived from a thought experiment about
how real human beings would, as a practical matter, think
about the social system they would prefer to live in if choosing
from behind the veil of ignorance.50
Some critics of the prophetic message have concluded that
it relies on both foundationalism and unified grand theory; that
its insistence on the need for transformative social change must
be grounded in commitments to a set of a priori constraints.
This is the conclusion Charles Meyers reached long ago, in his
influential reflections on sources of environmental thought.
Meyers wrote that "[t]he environmentalist would base public
policy on a set of values he holds to be transcendent and
absolute, inherent in the nature of man and therefore
ineluctable .... [He] construct[s] a hierarchy of values .. .
requir[ing] society to adopt a set of policies to implement those
values., 5'
Were this assessment valid, it would place prophecy and
pragmatism at loggerheads in their understanding of truth,
thereby making the pragmatic turn a hard one for prophets to
take. The assessment does not withstand further scrutiny,
however. As for foundationalism, the belief in limits to growth
can be, and I think usually is, grounded in the kind of
historical, contextual, contingent analysis of the world that
pragmatism embraces.5 2 It emerges from observing resource
consumption, calculating the available store of finite resources,
studying the carrying capacity of ecosystems and estimating
the trajectories of population growth. There is nothing a priori
or timeless about any of this. Malthus may have fathered the
idea of local ecosystem collapse, but contemporary limit-to-
growth concerns are predicated on post-World War II analysis
of post-World War II realities.
Grand unified theories are anathema to environmental
50. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 26, 93 (1993) (describing the
veil of ignorance and the principles of political justice as emerging from a
process of construction based on practical reason).
51. Meyers, supra note 7, at 451-52.
52. See text accompanying supra notes 37-38.
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pragmatists because pragmatists have a view of policy-making
that requires the accommodation of conflicting and
incommensurable values. This view also has firm roots in the
historical pragmatism of Dewey, who thought that solving
social problems necessarily entailed confronting clashing
values in which the ultimate resolution was heavily context-
dependent, and could not be preordained by any grand theory. 53
Such clashes of values could actually result in a change in
valuation. Dewey wrote,
If a person, for example, finds after due investigation that an
immense amount of effort is required to procure the conditions that
are the means required for realization of a desire (including perhaps
sacrifice of some other end-values that might be obtained by the same
expenditure of effort), does that fact react to modify his original desire
and hence, by definition, his valuation? A survey of what takes place
in any deliberate activity provides an affirmative answer to this
question."
Environmental pragmatists likewise oppose grand unified
theory, or what Stanley Fish has called "theory-hope"55 and
what Richard Rorty has called the desire for constraints that
will make "all contributions to a given discourse
commensurable.... [Where] 'commensurable'... mean[s] able
to be brought under a set of rules which will tell us how
rational agreement can be reached on what would settle the
issue on every point where statements seem to conflict."56 For
example, Farber starts a recent article with the observation
that "[e]nvironmental law raises perplexing issues about how to
handle tradeoffs between cost and environmental quality under
conditions of great scientific uncertainty."57  Shapiro and
Glicksman say that the "test of the wisdom of a solution to a
problem is the extent to which it accommodates social values
that are implicated by the nature of the problem. When these
values conflict, pragmatism attempts the difficult task of
finding solutions that accommodate conflicting values to the
53. FESTENSTEIN, supra note 33, at 35 (noting that the decision of what
ends to pursue "is not determinatively given in advance of consideration of the
particular circumstances within which an agent cuts").
54. JOHN DEWEY, INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA OF UNIFIED SCI., THEORY OF
VALUATION 25 (1939).
55. STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY 322-23 (1989).
56. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 316
(1979).
57. Daniel A. Farber, Green Scholarship-An Oxymoron?, 3 GREEN BAG
2d 231, 231 (2000).
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greatest extent possible." 58
Some accounts of the prophetic message assert that
prophets cannot tolerate such an approach to competing values
as environmental pragmatism embraces, but rather must be
committed to a theory that places any environmental gain
superior to any offsetting loss, no matter how little the gain nor
how great the loss. In Meyers's terms, environmental values
are "transcendent and absolute." 59 By another account, "tree
huggers" are people who "hold the environment sacred and
reject economic values as profane." 60
In my view, this interpretation of the prophetic message is
also a mistake. Prophetic views do not necessarily depend on
rejecting the incommensurability and plurality of values. I do
not doubt that there are elements of such a view to be found
within the Deep Ecology literature, but it seems to be far from
a requirement of the prophetic way of thinking about the
environment. Daly's "moral hammer" need not be based on
transcendent or absolute valuations in order to have force.
Sorting out the competing source-of-value claims made
within the broad literature of environmental philosophy and
ethics would force a greater detour here than I can make.
Instead, I will simply provide three observations to lend some
support to the view that a critical stance toward business as
usual regarding the environment and a pragmatic approach to
values need not be opposed to one another. First, Deep
Ecologists and others who voice the prophetic message have an
established record of extended and detailed investigations into
ways that we might satisfy human needs through methods that
are much less resource consumptive than the current status
quo. They order such investigations in significant part because
they recognize that satisfying human needs does indeed have a
significant value. A large part of the prophetic project seeks
ways to accommodate both a high degree of human need
satisfaction and environmental protection, not always to
denigrate the former. Prophets think that society's current
balance between the two is out of kilter, but they need not
think that the two do not have to be balanced at all. The "doing
more with less" movement, soft energy paths, hydrogen-based
fuel cells, recycling-these and other such efforts are not
58. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13, at 21.
59. Meyers, supra note 7, at 451-52.
60. FARBER, supra note 12, at 39.
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merely strategic efforts to reduce amoral or non-moral
opposition to the moral hegemony of environmentalism.
Instead, they are efforts to accommodate competing moral
values.
Second, much of the time that prophets have been
defending policies that might seem to endorse the absolute
value of environmental values, like policies of zero risk or the
Delaney Clause, they are doing so at least in part out of a
strategic calculation that the proposals to "reform" such policies
would sacrifice too much in the way of environmental
improvement, and not because they are opposed to all such
reforms. The willingness of environmentalists to give up the
absolutist Delaney Clause protection for pesticide residues on
food, for improvements elsewhere in the pesticide regulatory
system, recognizes competing values and displays a willingness
to compromise in appropriate cases. 61
Finally, Dewey was a man of strong moral and ethical
convictions that generated strong criticisms of the economic
and social policies of his time. Some of his proposals, such as
the nationalization of major segments of the economy, seem no
less "extreme" in relation to the problems he was addressing
than do the recommendations of many environmental prophets.
Dewey's strongly critical stance and his pragmatic commitment
to the context-dependent resolution of clashing values seem to
have been compatible in his case. This ought to make us
skeptical of any blanket claims that the rejection of grand
unified theory and strong criticism are incompatible.
Learning from experience is the final ingredient in
61. Federal statutes contain several versions of the Delaney Clause, each
of which, in different regulatory settings, flatly prohibits the use of substances
found to induce cancer in humans or animals. See, e.g., Les v. Reilly, 968 F.2d
985, 986-89 (9th Cir. 1992) (describing the operation of the Delaney Clause as
it applies to additives, including pesticide residues, in processed food); Public
Citizen v. Young, 831 F.2d 1108, 1109-10 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (describing the
operation of the Delaney Clause as it applies to FDA approval of color
additives). In 1996, industry and environmental advocates agreed to a
consensus revision of the federal government's approach to the regulation of
pesticide residues in processed food, eliminating the application of the Delaney
Clause to such residues, and replacing it with a standard that pesticide
residues must be reduced to a level that ensures a "reasonable certainty of no
harm." 21 U.S.C. § 346a(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2000). Included in the Food Quality
Protection Act (FQPA) of 1996 were other provisions aimed at streamlining
the regulatory process and at providing increased protection for children
exposed to pesticide residues. See ROBERT PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY (4th ed., forthcoming 2003)
(describing the contents of the FQPA).
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pragmatism's approach to truth that we identified at the
outset. I think there is little question that environmental
prophets can and do value learning from experience. Prophets
have long been beset with a deep sense of their inability to
understand the complexities of the world and its
interrelationships, and are acutely aware of the probability
that human decisions regarding the environment will err. A
concern about unintended consequences, those that lie beyond
our limited ability to anticipate, drives their interest in
avoiding large-scale interventions into the natural world. No
reason exists to suppose that prophets would think that we got
the first generation of environmental legislation just right. The
prophets' resistance to change stems from a suspicion that
"learning from experience" can cover an agenda of deregulation
that will point us in the wrong direction, not from an
indifference to iterative action and experimentation.
A lively sense of the extent of our uncertainty about so
many aspects of the world pervades pragmatism's emphasis on
learning. Comparing pragmatism's stance toward three types
of uncertainty to a prophetic stance can bring out some
additional detail regarding the compatibilities and tensions
between the two. One type of uncertainty is scientific
uncertainty regarding the composition and nature of
environmental hazards, the fate and transport mechanisms,
their potencies, their ecological and human consequences, and
so on. This is uncertainty about the way the physical world
works. With regard to this kind of uncertainty, pragmatism
urges continual scientific inquiry. Appreciation of the value of
scientific inquiry in this context is by no means unique to
pragmatism, however, and does not even constitute one of the
beliefs that make pragmatism a distinctive approach to
knowledge.
Where do prophets stand on the desirability of scientific
inquiry? Prophets generally support the precautionary
principle, and that principle has sometimes been derided as
"anti-science."62 Were that so, prophets might have to be
understood as dissenting from the interest of pragmatists in
improving scientific knowledge as applied to environmental
issues. The derision, however, is not justified. Prophets do
have genuine disagreements with the priests over what
62. See, e.g., Nancy Myers, Debating the Precautionary Principle,
available at http://www.sehn.org/ppdebate.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2003)
(responding to the charge that the precautionary principle is anti-science).
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quantum of scientific knowledge of risk ought to be sufficient to
justify precautionary action, but the best formulations of the
precautionary principle explicitly recognize the tentativeness of
precautionary decisions and direct that scientific inquiry
proceed in order to increase our knowledge of the risk
involved. 63
So, pragmatism's approach to scientific inquiry into how
the physical world functions is shared by the prophets. What
distinguished early pragmatism from formalism and other
forms of grand theory was its belief that the "methods of the
sciences should shape moral and political thinking."64
Pragmatists, especially Dewey, were "commit[ted] to the use of
the social sciences, and of scientific technology more generally,
in addressing social problems."65 One dimension of this
commitment was the view that the scientific method could be
adapted to acquiring knowledge about how human institutions
worked. Dewey held that pragmatic philosophy "could examine
how change served specific purposes, how individual
intelligences shaped things, how scientific administration
might beget increments of justice and happiness."66 Unless the
scientific method could be extended to the human problems, the
sole options were "routine, the force of some personality, strong
leadership or ... the pressure of momentary circumstances." 67
On the other hand, if the scientific method were extended to
the study of human institutions, human interactions, and the
regulatory instruments one might employ to produce better
results, social programs could be structured in ways that
worked. Thus, the second kind of uncertainty that concerned
pragmatists was uncertainty about how human institutions
work.
Reducing uncertainty regarding how different regulatory
instruments and institutions work also does not drive a wedge
between pragmatists and prophets. Both can acknowledge that
we have learned a great deal from the past thirty years of
63. John Applegate, The Prometheus Principle: Using the Precautionary
Principle to Harmonize the Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms, 9
IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 207, 254-55 (2001) (explaining how the
precautionary principle seeks to reduce uncertainty by increasing scientific
knowledge).
64. FESTENSTEIN, supra note 33, at 30.
65. Id.
66. BRUCE KUKLICK, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY IN AMERICA 1720-2000,
at 184 (2001).
67. Id. at 186.
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regulation and administration, and they may even agree on
some of the lessons learned. Still, had prophets had more
influence over the regulatory structure during this period, the
lines of inquiry and experimentation that we would have
pursued-and hence the store of knowledge upon which we
could now draw-would have been quite different from our
actual experience. 68
To cite an example, prophets would have devoted more
resources on technology forcing. A prominent idea at the time
of the initial environmental legislation, the concept of
technology forcing has essentially dropped from view in recent
years, even though asking industry to develop successful new
technologies that are also environmentally friendly would seem
to present one of those win-win situations we are so eager to
find. Some technology forcing efforts have continued,
prominent among them the California Air Resources Board's
(CARB) requirement that a percentage of California's new
vehicle fleet must consist of zero emissions vehicles (ZEVs).69
Although the requirement has been repeatedly deferred as the
mandatory model year approaches, CARB has refused to drop
the requirement altogether. Under the shadow of the looming
requirement, car manufacturers and third-party suppliers
continue active research and development programs in battery
powered electric cars and fuel cells.
In addition to technology forcing experiments, institutions
responsible for administering the nation's energy policy would
have resembled the Energy Research and Development Agency
(ERDA) under Jimmy Carter more than they did the
Department of Energy (DOE) under Ronald Reagan or either of
the Bushes. We would have been as intent on commercializing
solar energy as we now are on finding technological solutions to
the long-range disposal of high-level radioactive waste. Public
68. I do not mean to equate the actual history of the past thirty years in
gaining knowledge about and experimenting with human institutions with the
path environmental pragmatists would have pursued, either. See FARBER,
supra note 12, at 163-98 (suggesting a pragmatic agenda for institutional
reform and experimentation); SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13, at chs.
8-9 (suggesting a pragmatic agenda for institutional reform and
experimentation).
69. California's ZEV program has not succeeded in stimulating production
of a ZEV that is marketable without significant subsidy and compromises in
vehicle size. This does not yet mean it has failed, just that the experiment is
still underway. For program details, see California Air Resources Board Fact
Sheet, Zero Emission Vehicle Program Changes, at http://www.arb.ca.gov/
msprog/zevprog/factsheets/zevchanges.pdf (Dec. 10, 2001).
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utilities would have been reformed to become aggressive
instruments of energy conservation, with pricing systems that
do not reward consumption. The Pollution Prevention Act
would have been fully funded and used as a means of
stimulating further industrial efforts to reduce pollution levels
through changes in production processes and product design.
Experimentation and inquiry would have been different in
these ways because prophets would have been seriously seeking
to achieve a steady state economy or a sustainable society and
to lower the intensity and extent of human disruption of the
natural environment. Driving toward those objectives would
have been the organizing principle of environmental policy.
Prophets understand that the hardest problems environmental
policy faces arise when important social goals conflict with the
goal of making further environmental progress, and they
understand that societies only succeed if they are satisfying
multiple needs at once. So prophets would have seized upon
the opportunities for inquiry to explore ways in which
technological and institutional design can reduce the conflicts
between environmental quality and the other demands of
society.
The approach of the priests has been quite different.
Happy enough to take technological solutions where they arise
due to the dynamic experimentation of others, the priests'
narrow conception of social action leads them to adopt a static
management style for government. They aim to manage
conflict, increasingly through analytical techniques of
comprehensive rationality, rather than to use the resources of
government to experiment with ways that could avoid conflict.
Pragmatists and prophets, on the other hand, agree both on an
active role for government and on the importance of
experimentation.
Our existing environmental programs may not have
produced the experimentation prophets would most desire, but
they have done a good deal of valuable experimentation
nonetheless. Prophets are as eager as anyone to learn from the
experiments that have taken place. Even when it comes to
learning from experiments, however, what prophets learn bears
a distinctive stamp. Consider the substantial experience we
have gained in the last fifteen years with regard to how
emissions trading schemes work. Such trading schemes appear
on the recommendation lists of almost all the new schools of
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thought. In the typical cap-and-trade version, 70 government
sets its overall objectives or total emissions targets and assigns
initial emissions allowances to individual emissions sources
that are covered by the regulatory regime. 71 Those sources
then figure out how to avoid exceeding their allowed levels of
pollution, whether by adjusting manufacturing processes,
installing pollution control equipment, or purchasing some
allowances from another source. The opportunity to sell
allowances creates the prospect of a source "over-complying" in
order to have excess allowances that it can sell.
The cap-and-trade program, established under Title IV of
the Clean Air Act, which regulates acid rain precursors, is the
poster child for such programs, and some have used its success
to urge that environmental policy should adopt a presumption
in favor of emissions trading schemes, using them as the
preferred means of addressing pollution problems whenever
possible. While environmental priests argue that our
experience with emissions trading systems justifies
enthusiastic endorsement and view setting up trading markets
as the answer to an ever-expanding array of environmental
problems, prophets are much more cautious. They argue that
our experience with emissions trading systems counsels careful
monitoring, built in assurances of genuine pollution reduction
benefits, and limited application.
Prophets say that the acid rain success story needs to be
read alongside the setbacks to Los Angeles's Regional Clean Air
Incentives Market (RECLAIM). 72 That market for improving
air quality within Los Angeles's air basin through a declining
cap-and-trade program set initial allowances on the basis of
what was effectively an inflated baseline of historic emissions
levels. Consequently, numerous pollution sources came into
possession of excess allowances without doing any emissions
control, and the declining cap produced very little pollution
improvement. The market also generated hot spot problems by
permitting stationary sources to purchase allowances from
70. For an explanation of cap-and-trade emissions markets, see PERCIVAL
ET AL., supra note 61.
71. Several different initial allocation techniques are possible, but as a
practical matter, the existing cap-and-trade programs all begin with an
assignment of allowances based on past emissions levels, so that existing
sources are to a degree grandfathered into the marketing program.
72. For a description of the RECLAIM program and its problems, see
PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 61.
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dispersed sources. As a result the areas immediately around
some stationary sources saw emissions increase in their
immediate area. RECLAIM collapsed entirely in the summer
of 2001, when the California energy shortage compelled public
utilities to bring peaking power gas turbines on line to handle
base load demand. This resulted in greatly increased
utilization of those turbines, and concomitantly a sharp
increase in the demand for RECLAIM allowances to cover their
emissions. Prices for oxides of nitrogen allowances spiked to
$50,000 per ton and the utilities demanded relief. In response,
the air quality management district suspended requirements
for RECLAIM compliance by the public utilities.73
Contrasting interpretations of such experiments will
continue to be typical. Experiments in human institutions
generally produce more ambiguous lessons than we would like.
Such experimentation, however, can shed some light on how to
improve regulatory and institutional design, and therefore we
should encourage it. At the same time, we should not expect
the elimination of uncertainty with regard to this type of
inquiry any more than we can anticipate the elimination of
uncertainty with regard to scientific inquiries into the
functioning of the physical world. 74 One reason the results of
human experiments are interpreted differently by different
people is that we view the results of the experiments through
the biases and presuppositions that we bring to the problem at
hand. Prophets tend to be alert to the possibilities and
propensities of regulatory systems to be manipulated and their
effectiveness undermined, which leads them to worry about the
deficiencies or potential deficiencies in such systems. Priests
tend to be alert to the ability of such systems to harness self-
interest in the service of the public good, which leads them to
stress the upside potential of such systems. Pragmatists
understand that people bring such biases and prejudices with
them in responding to social problems, and the interpretation
of experiments in institutional and instrument design can be no
different. One job of pragmatic philosophy is to provide a
"critique of prejudices," 75 examining them to "form the best
73. Id.
74. Alvin M. Weinberg first highlighted the problem of "trans-scientific"
questions--questions that are phrased as though science ought to be able to
answer them but which it is actually unable to answer. Alvin M. Weinberg,
Science & Trans-Science, 10 MINERvA 209, 209 (1972).
75. EXPERIENCE AND NATURE, supra note 43, at 37.
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judgment possible about what led us to like this sort of thing,
and what has issued from the fact that we liked it."76 At the
same time, pragmatists acknowledge that there are many ways
of interpreting the events in our lives thought to support our
biases.77 So experimentation needs to continue, but we should
not expect it to resolve all disputes over regulatory strategies
and institutional design.
Something in addition to the play of biases and
presuppositions can cause people to extract different lessons
from experiments in human institutions. The knowledge being
sought from these experiments is being sought for one reason:
to help us determine ways to design human institutions that
fulfill our environmental objectives. These objectives are
themselves a source of dispute. Crudely put, priests seek to
optimize pollution, are relatively indifferent to the impact of
human alterations of the environment on nonhuman things
(save those providing feedback that affects the satisfaction of
human wants), discount (literally) the interests of future
generations and do not think there are limits to growth.
Prophets seek to minimize pollution, care about human impacts
on nonhuman things, worry about future generations, and
believe there are limits to growth. These different convictions
motivate different environmental objectives, different senses of
urgency, different assessments of trade offs with other values,
and so on. Through the adoption of a pragmatic method,
environmental pragmatists suggest that the uncertainty about
these sorts of things-ends and values-can be overcome. This
brings us to the third kind of uncertainty pragmatism promises
to overcome with the application of the methods of science.
IV. THE ANALYSIS OF ENDS
Pragmatists think that values should not be debated by the
logic of general notions or grand theory-doing so is Step 1 in
Farber's recipe for stalemate. Instead, values ought to be
debated in the same way that anything else whose truth
concerns us can be debated, by figuring out whether certain
values are useful. A belief is true when "holding the belief
leads us into more useful relations with the world."7 8 In
76. QUEST FOR CERTAINTY, supra note 43, at 272.
77. Id. ("[T]here are many ways of interpreting what in the past is
authoritative.").
78. SHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 13, at 15 (quoting Louis Menand,
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Dewey's understanding, a value judgment is a species of
practical judgment and ought to be evaluated by ascertaining
its usefulness to the decision maker. 79
Values are susceptible to rational appraisal because, having the
logical shape of practical judgments, they contain a claim about the
consequences of acting on them, and implicitly a causal judgement
[sic] about the circumstances in which the action takes place. They
may be appraised by assessing the extent to which they 'unify' the
situation.
80
When deliberating over values, each competing option "takes
its turn projecting itself upon the screen of the imagination. It
unrolls a picture of its future history."8' Experimentation,
inquiry, and the testing of hypotheses improve our ability to
paint an accurate picture of how the pursuit of a particular
value will unfold. Our ultimate practical judgment regarding
the value depends, then, upon our ability to discern its
consequences.
This general description of a method of practical inquiry
ought to be one that prophets can embrace. Indeed, many
prophets have come to their views precisely by "unrolling a
picture of the future history" of competing policy approaches to
environmental problems. When the prophet looks at competing
futures, ones with a great deal less environmental degradation
and greater respect for environmental preservation and quality
look better to her than the future that will be produced by
status quo policies.
A difficulty faced by this method, by whomever pursued, is
the familiar one of uncertainty. It is just not possible to be
terribly confident that the pictures of the future that we
unroll-even when premised on the best science, the most
intensive inquiries, the most concerted efforts to learn from
experience-are accurate or not. It has never been entirely
clear how pragmatists thought we ought to distinguish among
alternative policies when the implications of the alternatives
were fuzzy and subject to great error. Nonetheless, this much
is clear and certain: Uncertainty is a problem that any
approach to environmental problem solving must face. The
commitments of the prophets do not put them on any different
Introduction, to PRAGMATISM: A READER (Louis Menand, ed. 1997)).
79. See FESTENSTEIN, supra note 33, at 34.
80. Id. at 40.
81. FESTENSTEIN, supra note 33, at 36 (citing JOHN DEWEY, THE MIDDLE
WORKS 1899-1924, at 133 (Jo Ann Boydston ed. 1922).
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footing vis-a-vis uncertainty than any other set of commitments
aimed at setting environmental policy on the basis of forward-
looking considerations.
That said, the specific policy positions one endorses can
and should always remain open to revision. Were someone to
develop a persuasive picture of the future in which largely
market-driven decisions did not conflict with the maintenance
or restoration of environmental quality, I can see no defensible
reason for strong environmentalists to close their eyes to that
picture. Should someone develop a persuasive picture of the
future in which the ill-wisdom of according moral consideration
to future generations or nonhuman species could be
demonstrated, I can see no defensible reason for strong
environmentalists to close their eyes to that picture, either.
In other words, I see no inconsistency between pragmatic
insistence on fallibilism about ends on the one hand, and
current commitments to prophetic views on the other. So on
the question of whether or not prophets could accept the idea
that ends ought to be subject to reappraisal of the kind upon
which pragmatism insists, my answer is a tentative yes.
Perhaps the biggest reason for the apparent clash between
pragmatism's embrace of the kind of practical reasoning just
sketched and the prophetic message is that prophets often
paint future scenarios so unlike the current state of affairs that
they seem to require near revolutionary upheavals in the
current way of doing things. Pragmatism, in contrast, seems
more incremental. Pragmatic inquiries always begin embedded
in our existing social and normative structures and practices.
Thus, Farber's eco-pragmatism "grows out of our society's
current practice." 82  Pragmatists embrace an incremental
strategy because, along with being anti-foundationalists, they
are anti-skeptics as well. For them, critical inquiry takes place
as a response to specific doubts, problems or difficulties. As
that problem-driven inquiry proceeds, a good deal of the
normative underpinnings and presuppositions of a culture or
society remain unquestioned. So in that sense, one would
anticipate that pragmatic answers would seldom be radically
discontinuous with existing practices and values. Bruce
Kuklick's understanding of Dewey's approach to social
problems supports this moderate and meliorist interpretation.
82. FARBER, supra note 12, at 11.
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"Dewey," Kuklick writes,
steered between those who thought progress impossible and those
who thought dramatic progress immediately achievable by revolution.
His evolutionary metaphysics made the present a fulcrum for modest
and responsible change.... Radicalism, as a future-oriented
consciousness without mediation by the past and present, only rashly
anticipated the world as it might be. Conservatism, on the contrary,
unthinkingly imported the past into the present and future.
According to Dewey, only the present, the meeting-place of past and
future, could synthesize both political views into intelligent action.
The genuine social reformer interpreted each of the extremes to the
other. Joining the wisdom of the past to the vision of the future
would resolve conflict in the present.83
It is too simplistic to equate priests with unyielding
conservatism or prophets with unrealistic radicalism. It is also
not unfair, however, to see environmental pragmatism
positioning itself as the middle term in the equation: the one
that can "synthesize both political views into intelligent
action., 84
Pragmatism promises more than political pluralism,
however.85 As Dewey thought of it, pragmatism was "criticism
of the influential beliefs that underlie culture ... which
considers the mutual compatibility of the elements of the total
structure of beliefs."86 Although it does not put everything
under the critical microscope at once, it does promise to provide
a way to evaluate values, biases, prejudices, and beliefs. At the
level of individual decision making, Dewey drew famous
distinctions between "the enjoyed and the enjoyable, the
desired and the desirable, the satisfying and the
satisfactory.... The fact that something is desired only raises
the question of its desirability; it does not settle it."8 7 With
pragmatism, in other words, it ought to be possible that
someone has wants or desires that are ill-advised and ought to
be changed. 88 The same applies to questions of social policy.
83. KUKLICK, supra note 66, at 181.
84. See id.
85. Lisa Heinzerling has pointed out the problem in a position that is
entirely dependent upon a political equilibrium. Heinzerling, supra note 31,
at 1430 (suggesting that positions justified by appeal to political consensus are
defenseless against changes in that consensus).
86. FESTENSTEIN, supra note 33, at 25 (emphasis added) (quoting QUEST
FOR CERTAINTY, supra note 43, at 207).
87. QUEST FOR CERTAINTY, supra note 43, at 260.
88. Hilary Putnam, Comment on Robert Brandon's Paper, in PUTNAM,
supra note 25, at 61 ("Dewey is quite willing to say that you may have the
wrong wants.").
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When one writer interpreted the task of legal reasoning as
"simply... keep[ing] the system going well enough so that
there isn't a violent revolution," Hilary Putnam replied that
this was a very different role from "the (classical) pragmatist
position that I am arguing for.... Dewey and I," he continued,
"are committed to the existence of such a thing as a reasonable
outcome to a discussion, and not just the existence of politically
successful outcomes." 89
Such a critical stance toward the status quo certainly
resonates with the prophetic message. Sound and
understandable reasons exist for wanting to demonstrate how
one's policy position is actually an explication or a working out
of views already held by the American people, and most
prophets are pleased that environmental protection has become
a significant and stable component of public opinion. Yet many
prophets want to push further and faster than the general
public is yet willing to go. Indeed, it is always an open question
within prophetic circles as to whether prophets ought to
participate in the policy-making game at all, precisely because
it involves so many compromises with public opinion and
political acceptability. This has been an on-going debate within
Germany's Green Party, for instance, personified by the
competition between Petra Kelly and Joschka Fischer. Lately,
Kelly's vision of the Green Party as the anti-party party has
been losing to Fischer's more pragmatic approach. Fischer's
approach received a substantial boost in September 2002, when
the increase in the Green Party's vote accounted for the margin
of victory for Gerhard Schroeder's coalition government-an
outcome certain to increase Fischer's clout in the German
administration. This is an issue that prophets continually face,
and they face it because they believe so passionately in their
position and they understand that their policies will have to be
trimmed if they are to have influence within the halls of
government. 90 At the end of the day, a disagreement about the
89. Id. at 39.
90. One vignette exists on each side of this question. In 1993, Petra Kelly
is quoted as saying, "I am sometimes afraid that the greens will suddenly get
13 percent in an election and turn into a power-hungry party. It would be
better for us to stay at 6 or 7 percent and remain uncompromising in our basic
demands. Better to do that than have green ministers." ANDREI MARKOVITS
& PHILIP GORSKI, THE GERMAN LEFT: RED, GREEN AND BEYOND 123 (1993).
By the late 1990s, Joschka Fischer, German foreign minister, was authorizing
German support for NATO bombing of Serbs. NEIL CARTER, THE POLITICS OF
THE ENVIRONMENT 113 (2001).
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pace of change may be the most important tension between
pragmatists and prophets. 91
CONCLUSION
Recall that pragmatism's appeal to the prophets originally
went something like this: Take the pragmatic turn. This is a
way to make further progress toward the objectives to which
you are committed. Together we can claim a determining role
in policy debates to protect the planet and achieve a
sustainable society. Pragmatism's essential appeal is thus that
it is the best bet for putting environmental policy on a glide
path to the goals that the prophets want, and indeed the
steepest glide path feasible. The prophets worry, however, that
pragmatism risks morphing into political pluralism-all glide
and no path. So prophets will continue to push for faster
change; they have concluded that the anvil and the hammer
require faster responses. The greatest uneasiness many
environmental prophets have with emerging pragmatic
thinking applied to the environment may lie in a worry about
whether a pragmatic tendency toward the more gradual belies
a lack of commitment to the environmental values prophets
hold dear.
Notwithstanding this continuing source of tension between
some prophets and some pragmatists, this Essay has attempted
to show that there are fewer unbridgeable gaps between a
prophetic perspective and a pragmatic one than a casual
inquiry and the usual juxtaposition of the two might suggest.
Even this remaining tension between prophets and pragmatists
may ultimately prove beneficial to each. On the one hand, it
may take the jeremiads of the environmental prophets to
discipline pragmatism's tendencies in the direction of
directionless incrementalism and political pluralism, always
raising questions about whether what is being proposed is truly
the best that can be done. On the other hand, absent the kind
of radical individual level transformation of values some
prophets have insisted is necessary, but which seems highly
unlikely to be forthcoming, the attention to critical learning
from experience and engagement with the competing social
values that pragmatism espouses may be the best way to move
in the direction the prophets desire.
91. I thank Sid Shapiro for pressing this point with me.
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